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Equipment leasing transactions arise in an endless array of contexts.
Each context involves its own special set of tax and legal considerations.
Since there is so much ground to cover, I will follow the outline, be-
ginning with Part I, and will move through it rapidly.
Let us begin with the one question that is common to every leasing
transaction-does the lease constitute a true lease for tax purposes; or
is it actually a conditional sale of the property or a financing arrange-
ment?
The law is a good place to begin the discussion concerning this com-
plex topic. Section 162 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a
deduction for
rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition
to the continued use . . . of property to which the taxpayer
has not or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
[Emphasis added.]
Scanty though it may be, this is the touchstone of true lease questions
under the Internal Revenue Code, and it turns on the question whether
the lessee is taking title or obtains an equity in the property.
Before getting further into the outline, I must mention the 1978
Supreme Court Lyon decision which will be discussed in more detail
later. In Lyon, the Supreme Court held that there was a true lease.
Although Lyon involved a sale/leaseback of real estate, the Court's
reasoning concerning true lease status is relevant in reviewing any
lease.
The Internal Revenue Service appears to regard Lyon as a special
case dealing with a narrow set of facts. In the two 1980 Technical
Advice Memoranda and the one 1979 Technical Advice Memorandum
noted in the outline, the Service confirmed its 1955 rulings pertaining
to the classification of equipment leases and specifically found that Lyon
generally does not cause a change in the Service's guidelines. Hence,
the Service confirmed that Rev. Rul. 55-540 and certain other published
rulings which follow Rev. Rul. 55-540 still constitute the government's
view on equipment leases.
Rev. Rul. 55-540 holds that a purchase and sale rather than a lease
or rental agreement will generally be found to exist if any one of six
conditions is present. The three conditions which are of principal im-
portance today are:
* Note: Citations for the authority mentioned herein can be found in the ac-
companying outline.
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1. The total amount which the lessee is required to pay for a rela-
tively short period of use constitutes a large portion of the total
sum required to be paid to secure the transfer of title.
2. The agreed rental payments materially exceed the current fair
market value.
3. The property may be acquired under a purchase option at a nomi-
nal or relatively small price.
The true touchstone of Rev. Rul. 55-540 and the principal basis of its
importance today is its emphasis on whether the lessee had or was
obtaining an equity interest-like the test referred to in the statute.
Rev. Rul. 55-541 points out a problem that many practitioners tend
to overlook and is one of the most important equipment leasing rulings.
It involved equipment that had an estimated useful life of from ten to
fifteen years. The "lease" agreement permitted the lessee to use the
equipment for thirteen years. The lessee had no option to acquire the
property. The ruling nonetheless holds that the lessee in effect bought
the property because he had the right to use the property for substan-
tially all of its useful life. To repeat this point-and I believe it is a
valid position taken by the Internal Revenue Service-if a lessee has
the right to use leased property for substantially all of the life of the
leased property, the transaction will be recast as a purchase even though
the lessee has no right to acquire title to the property under a purchase
option or any other manner. The 1979 Technical Advice Memorandum
noted in the outline confirms that the Service still follows this view.
The two 1980 Technical Advice Memoranda confirm that fancy
devices used to avoid the traditional tests will not work. They also
provide important general guidelines for anyone who has an interest in
the classification of a lease. In short, they are high on the equipment
leasing recommended reading list.
As noted in the outline, TAM 8019120 involved "terminal rental
adjustments." This was basically a device whereby the lessee received
a rental rebate if the lessor ultimately sold the property at a profit or
the lessee was required to pay additional rent at the end of the lease if
the property could not be sold for enough to provide the lessor a
specified return. The Service held that the lessee in effect owned the
equipment as the result of this device.
Similarly, TAM 8020014 holds that giving the lessor the right to
require the lessee to purchase the equipment at a specified price under
a put or call effectively causes the burdens and benefits of ownership to
lie with the lessee.
These rulings and TAM's show why the Service describes its method
of analyzing lease transactions as the "burdens and benefits" method.
Let us shift briefly from the government's view of leases to the courts'
view. Generally, the courts have been much more liberal in treating
purported leases as true leases than has the Internal Revenue Service.
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The court decisions have been decided more often than not based on
the "intent" of the parties. As a practical matter, there should not be
much difference between the government's "burdens and benefits" test
and the courts' "intent" test. When the courts refer to the "intent" of
the parties, they are not, or at least should not be, referring to the
stated or expressed intent of the parties. Rather, the courts should be
referring to the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties.
Thus, the courts should analyze a lease and look at the factors which
reflect the burdens and benefits of ownership in order to determine the
actual bona fide intent of the parties. Howevet, the judicial opinions
generally speak more about intent and do not enunciate a clear set of
objective standards.
The Davis case cited in the outline is a recent example of an equip-
ment lease decision. It follows the traditional line of investigating the
intent of the parties. The case is important because it is a recent pro-
nouncement on the subject and because it specifically finds the Lyon
case relevant to a straight equipment lease transaction even though
Lyon involved a sale/leaseback of real estate.
We have already alluded to the real estate sale/leaseback cases to
some extent and have observed that these cases are relevant to equip-
ment leases.
Lazarus is the landmark decision in the area. Since the purported
lessee had a ninety-nine year lease with an option to renew and pur-
chase, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court held that the lessee
was the true owner of the property. It also is not surprising that Lazarus
has little significance to present-day leases.
Lyon is notable for its failure to establish clear guidelines. However,
it is a Supreme Court decision and it is recent. Thus, it is imperative
that we spend some time analyzing the case and noting some of its more
important points.
First, the Court's finding that there was a true lease was based in
large part on the fact that nontax considerations were a major factor
in shaping the transaction. The lessee was a bank that was prohibited
by regulatory authorities from acquiring certain property. Since the
lessee desperately needed the property, it was compelled to enter into
a leasing transaction with the taxpayer, Lyon, which was the lessor.
This nontax compulsion to enter into a leasing transaction was appar-
ently quite important to the Supreme Court.
Second, the Supreme Court found that the transaction was not shaped
by tax avoidance motives and features, that the lessee could have used
the investment tax credit and other tax benefits as well as the lessor,
and that there was no net loss of tax dollars to the government because
of the lease form of the transaction. It follows from these findings that
a lease that is structured as a lease primarily because of tax considera-
tions not only will be scrutinized very closely in the future, but is apt to
fail to qualify as a true lease.
Third, it is impossible to discuss Lyon without mentioning one im-
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portant and puzzling aspect. The Court distinguished Lazarus because,
and seemed to find great comfort in the fact that, it had before it a
genuine three-party transaction. It specifically identified the three par-
ties as the lessor, the lessee and the "finance agency." Whether the term
"finance agency" refers to the bank which lent the money to the lessor
for the purchase of the property or refers to the regulatory agency
which compelled the lessee to lease the property is a mystery. If the
term "finance agency" refers to the regulatory agency that compelled
the lease transaction, the Supreme Court's decision makes good sense.
On the other hand, since almost every leasing transaction is a leveraged
lease, meaning that the lessor borrows part or all the money with which
to buy the property, it is difficult to see how the presence of a lendor
can influence a court to hold that a transaction is a true lease. At least
one other commentator agrees with my view that the Supreme Court
was referring to the regulatory agency. However, most commentators,
without discussing the point and apparently without realizing that a
question exists, assume that the Court was referring to the lending
institution.
Fourth and last, Lyon involved a fixed purchase option for an amount
equal to the unpaid debt. The Supreme Court specifically stated that
the District Court had held that the option prices were approximately
equal to fair market value and that it was not likely that the lessee
would exercise the options, and the Supreme Court rested its decision
on the District Court's findings of fact. Hence, the Supreme Court ap-
proved options at stated prices, where the parties can show that such
prices are expected to be approximately equal to fair market value at
the time of exercise.
It is essential to at least mention the American Realty Trust case.
That is the most recent case in our own jurisdiction concerning the
validity of a lease. The case has added significance because the Supreme
Court agreed to hear Lyon because the Eighth Circuit's holding in Lyon
was thought to conflict with the Fourth Circuit's decision in American
Realty Trust. By reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Lyon, the
Supreme Court inferentially affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision in
American Realty Trust. Unfortunately, as with most cases involving the
subject, the American Realty Trust opinion does not establish a good
set of objective standards for practitioners to follow. On balance, the
decision seems to rest on findings that tax considerations did not compel
a lease transaction and that it was a close question whether the lease
was a bona fide lease. Because the consequences of reclassifying the
lease would have been so dire in the particular case-the taxpayer
would have lost its status as a real estate investment trust-the Court
rightfully decided that it should respect the classification the parties had
given the transaction.
The Hilton case noted in the outline is important because it is so
current and because it may help us begin to understand Lyon. The
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Hilton court found that the lessee was economically compelled to lease
the property for various reasons, including the fact that it could obtain
only 75 percent financing by borrowing, but could obtain 100 percent
financing by leasing. However, Hilton held that economic compulsion
on the lessee to lease property does not resolve the question. Hilton
held that the substantiality of the lessor's position must still be examined
to determine if there is a true lease. The court found that tax advan-
tages were the only benefits derived by the lessors, which were limited
partnerships. Based on that finding, it held that there the lessors were
not entitled to claim depreciation.
Thus, Hilton dramatizes two of the requirements of Lyon. It shows
that where tax savings are the principal motive behind a lease transac-
tion, it will be subject to especially close scrutiny and may well be re-
classified as something other than a lease. Hilton also shows that
economic compulsion on the part of the lessee to lease property does
not mean necessarily that the lease will be treated as a true lease from
the lessor's viewpoint.
You should note the two leasing company cases, Lockhart Leasing
and Northwest Acceptance. If your client is. or interest is in, a leasing
company, you will want to study them carefully.
Can we draw any meaningful conclusions from the foregoing cases
and rulings concerning leases? Unfortunately, no clear pattern arises,
but we perceive at least three general rules:
(1) If the lessee has the use of the equipment over substantially all
of the equipment's useful life, the lessee will be treated as the
owner of the equipment.
(2) If the lessee will obtain title or can obtain title for a relative
nominal price, the lessee will be treated as the owner.
(3) If the lessor's only significant benefit from the transaction is tax
savings, the transaction will probably be recast as something
other than a true lease as to the lessor.
Most present-day lease transactions are consummated in a way to avoid
these clear cut results. Hence, we are still left to search for meaningful
objective standards.
The next substantial part of the outline is devoted to the IRS ruling
guidelines concerning leveraged leases. As you know, ruling guidelines
are not necessarily intended to reflect the true state of the law. How-
ever, unless and until the courts can establish clearer objective guide-
lines for classifying leases, we are virtually compelled to either obtain
a ruling from the IRS or to follow as closely as possible the ruling
guidelines. I would not suggest using the ruling guidelines as the basis
for assessing this problem on its merits unless I believed the ruling
guidelines represented a reasonable interpretation of law. Therefore,
when I recommend using the leveraged lease guidelines as an objective
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basis for assessing leases, I necessarily have concluded that the ruling
guidelines generally are not unreasonable.
Because of the press of time, I cannot explore in great detail the IRS
leveraged lease guidelines set forth Rev. Proc. 75-21. The requirements
can be briefly listed as follows:
(1) The lessor must have an initial 20% minimum investment or
unconditional liability in the property.
(2) The lessee cannot have any investment in the property or make
any loans for that purpose.
(3) The property must be shown to have an estimated fair market
value at the end of the lease term at least equal to 20% of its
original cost.
(4) The property must be shown to have an estimated life at the
end of the lease term that is at least 20% of its original life or
1 year, whichever is longer.
(5) No member of lessee group can have an option to purchase the
property at other than fair market value at the time of exercise.
(6) The lessor must expect to realize a net profit and must expect a
reasonable positive cash flow.
(7) Options to renew at other than fair market value are added to
the term of the lease.
Obviously, in those few transactions in which there is no borrowing,
the 20% equity requirement is irrelevant.
In addition, the guidelines pertaining to the lessor's profit and invest-
ment position appear to be totally irrelevant when reviewing a lease
solely from the standpoint of a lessee. The lessor's profit and investment
requirements may be valid for advance ruling purposes but they have
nothing to do with a "true lease" from a lessee's viewpoint.
Particularly in light of the Lyon decision, the requirement that any
purchase option be at the then "fair market value" and the requirement
that all renewal options at other than fair market value be taken into
account in determining the terms of the lease are somewhat question-
able. Lyon and other case law establish that, if a fixed dollar purchase
or renewal option price can be shown to approximate fair market value
based on conditions as they exist at the time of the lease, it should not
be assumed that the lessee will exercise either the purchase or renewal
options and the options should not jeopardize the treatment of the lease.
The Revenue Procedure requires the lessor to have an initial 20 per-
cent equity investment and purports to require the lessor to "maintain"
his 20 percent equity throughout the terms of the lease. However, the
mechanics of complying with the Revenue Procedure show that the
"maintenance" requirement is nonexistent. The mechanics require the
lessor to recover his profit ratably over the term of the lease but do not
require him to maintain his 20 percent investment.
Rev. Proc. 76-30, which sets forth the IRS advance ruling position
with respect to special or limited use property, is also quite important.
If property is of such a special nature or design that it can be used by
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no one other than the lessee, there is a serious question whether any
purported lease of the property is a true lease. You will certainly want
to review Rev. Proc. 76-30 to determine whether the IRS would view
leased property as special or limited use property for advance ruling
purposes.
The Electric & Neon case is relevant only because the court failed
to consider the fact that the property was special or limited use prop-
erty. The property involved was neon and other signs that were made
especially for the lessees and which had no use other than to the lessees.
The court did not mention the possibility that the leases were not valid
leases because the property was special or limited use property. Quite
frankly, I believe the government simply overlooked this argument.
Nevertheless, if you are faced with the issue, you might cite this case as
authority for the proposition that "limited" or "special" use is not rele-
vant in determining whether there is a true lease.
The discussion of gift/leaseback law in this jurisdiction can be ex-
tremely brief. Under present law, as reflected in the Perry decision,
gift/leasebacks simply are not allowed in most situations. In that de-
cision, our Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Fifth Circuit in
holding that there must be a business reason for the entire transaction-
the gift and the leaseback-for the transaction to be sustained. In most
situations it will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet that requirement.
The requirement is clearly different from that of the Tax Court and
several other circuits. The Quinlivan case illustrates the latter view.
As noted in the outline, Rev. Rul. 72-408 and Rev. Rul. 72-543
show the consequences of having a lease reclassified as either a con-
ditional sale and a financing transaction, respectively.
As you are aware, whether a purported lease constitutes a true lease
is also important for non-tax reasons. For example, if a purported lease
is found to be a conditional sale under state law, and the purported
lessor has not properly reserved a security interest in the property, he
could have problems. On the other hand, were the "lessor" to file a
"financing" statement, without carefully identifying himself as a lessor,
that filing might be used as evidence of a conditional sale in a federal
tax case. Virginia and several other states have now enacted statutes
which allow a lessor to perfect a security interest in situations like this
and specifically provide that the filing will not be a factor in determining
whether the transaction is a true lease.
It is also important to determine whether the purported lease con-
stitutes a true lease for purposes of the Federal Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act. It is important to make the distinction because different
disclosures are required depending upon the classification of the trans-
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action as a credit sale or as a lease. Regulation Z defines the terms and
considerations involved in connection with this problem.
As you all know, whether a lease constitutes a true lease is just as
important for financial accounting purposes as it is for tax purposes.
Fortunately, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has set reason-
ably objective standards. Basically, a purported lease will not be treated
as a true lease if one of four conditions is met:
1. The ownership passes to the lessee at the end of the lease.
2. The lessee has an option to purchase the property for less than
fair market value.
3. The lease term is 75 percent or more of the asset's estimated
economic life.
4. The present value of the minimum lease payments is 90 percent
or more of the fair market value of the leased asset.
Although the objective accounting rules, in general, parallel the tax
concepts, the objective accounting rules do not determine the classifica-
tion of a lease for tax purposes.
That completes our review of the one broad consideration-the true
lease problem-that is common to all leasing transactions and is prob-
ably the most important one. We will now turn our attention to a
plethora of additional problems that vary in importance depending upon
the type of leasing transaction. Because of the great number of prob-
lems and the press of time, I will hurriedly review the items enumerated
in the outline.
Generally, a lessor of equipment is subject to the "at risk" rules pre-
scribed by Code § 465. Steph Tucker has fully explored this subject, so
we will move along to the next subject.
As you know, items of tax preference are now an extremely im-
portant aspect of any transaction or potential investment. The two most
important items of tax preference in connection with equipment leasing
are accelerated depreciation on leased property and rapid amortization
on those items of equipment that qualify for such treatment. (Since
1975, accelerated depreciation on all leased property, not just net leased
property, is a tax preference item. Therefore, you may want to delete
the word "net" from your outline.) Of course, capital gain also would
be an important tax preference item if the equipment could be sold for
enough profit to produce capital gains. Since all depreciation on ma-
chinery and equipment is subject to recapture, it is somewhat unusual
to realize capital gains on the sale of equipment. There are some situa-
tions, however-such as airplanes which appreciate in value-in which
capital gain might be realized.
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I am sure you are familiar with the limitation on the deduction of
investment interest. Interest on "net lease" property is treated as invest-
ment interest. Because the definition of "net lease" is important in more
than one instance, I have devoted Part VI of the outline to that subject
and we will talk more about it later.
If a partnership is used to purchase and lease equipment, there are
several partnership matters which must be considered. Once again, since
Steph Tucker already has explored partnerships, my favorite topic, in
some depth, I will mention only one special rule. Unbeknownst to many
practitioners, the investment tax credit regulations specifically provide
that all investment tax credit must be allocated in accordance with the
ratio in which the partners divide the general profits of the partnership.
The major exception applies only if all related items of income, gain,
loss, and deduction with respect to an item of section 38 property are
specially allocated, and if that special allocation of items is effective
under Code § 704. In that situation, the investment tax credit can be
allocated in the same proportion. These regulations, which are not noted
in the outline, are found at section 1.46-3(f).
Reg. § 1.47-6 contains a complementary set of rules pertaining to
the recapture of investment tax credit. These rules generally require
recapture when a partner's share of profits is reduced by more than
one-third.
With that, I will move to Part V of the outline-to the topic which
shares first place with the "true lease" concept as the most important to
equipment leasing-investment tax credit and depreciation.
Of paramount importance to anyone considering an equipment lease
is the general prohibition contained in Code § 46(e) (3) against a
noncorporate lessor's claiming the investment tax credit. The rule can
be summarized as follows:' any noncorporate lessor generally is not
allowed to claim the investment tax credit. (For this purpose, a Sub-
chapter S corporation is treated as a noncorporate lessor.)
There are four possible ways of avoiding the problem. First, the
statutory prohibition does not apply if the noncorporate lessor manu-
factures or produces the property. Rev. Rul. 75-1 strictly construes this
exception and holds that a taxpayer will not be treated as manufacturing
or producing property when the property is manufactured or produced
for him by an independent contractor.
The second exception-and this is the one that taxpayers most often
attempt to meet-provides that the credit will be allowed if the lease
term is less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property and if the
Section 162 deductions with respect to the property are greater than 15
percent of the rental income from the property during the first twelve
months after the property is transferred to the lessee.
There have been two important recent developments in connection
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with the requirement that the lease term be less than 50 percent of the
useful life of the property. In Bloomberg, the taxpayer discovered too
late that the term of his lease to his professional corporation exceeded
50 percent of the life of the leased property. Thinking quickly, he
cancelled the lease and contended that, because of the cancellation, the
lease was for less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property. The
Tax Court held that the test must be applied at the time the equipment
is placed in service and that a subsequent premature cancellation will
not change the result.
Technical Advice Memorandum 7928004 has grave overtones in
connection with leases between related parties. The taxpayer leased
items of equipment to a corporation in which he owned or controlled
approximately 75 to 80 percent of the stock. Employees owned the
remaining stock in each of the corporations. There were no written
leases; the taxpayer simply informally leased the items to the corpora-
tions on a "as needed basis." The Service concluded that the leases
would be treated as indefinite in duration and would be treated as
though they lasted for the entire useful life of the properties. The con-
clusion was based primarily upon the close relationship between the
individual lessor and the lessee corporations.
If this position were carried to its extreme, a taxpayer could never
lease property to a related entity and meet the 50 percent test. How-
ever, if the taxpayer and his controlled or related corporation deal with
each other in an arm's length fashion and enter into a written agree-
ment dealing with the terms and specifications of a lease, the Service
should not attempt to apply this doctrine.
Another troublesome aspect of this TAM should be noted. Because
of the lessor's control of the corporate lessees, the TAM concluded
that the leases would be treated as covering the entire useful life of the
properties. Under this view, the lessee effectively had the use of the
properties over their entire useful lives. Hence, the leases should not
have been treated as true leases at all. This conclusion is troublesome
because the Service did not mention it and because it represents another
absurd possible extension of the apparent holding of the TAM.
The other part of this exception that allows noncorporate lessors to
claim the credit-that is, Section 162 expenses must exceed 15 percent
of rental income during the first twelve months-is very similar to the
requirements pertaining to "net leases" which will be discussed in more
detail later.
A third possible way of avoiding the noncorporate lessor limitation
is to make the election to pass the credit through to the lessee. The
election applies only to new property and it must be filed by the return
due date. In Rev. Rul. 79-414 the taxpayer, like the one in Bloomberg,
discovered too late that he was not entitled to the investment tax credit.
It was represented in the ruling that the taxpayer's accountant was not
aware of the law that prevents a noncorporate lessor from claiming the
credit. The taxpayer accordingly asked the commissioner to grant a
reasonable extension to make the election to pass the credit through to
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the lessee. The Service held that it would not grant an extension in such
circumstances.
The fourth possible method for a noncorporate lessor to claim the
credit can only be used if a partnership is the lessor. In that situation,
the corporate partners can claim the credit and it may be possible to
allocate an extra portion of the credit to the corporate partners. How-
ever, since the credit must be allocated generally in proportion to profits,
special allocation may not be possible.
If we can avoid the noncorporate lessor problems, we must consider
a few other investment tax credit limitations. First, there is the general
limitation on the amount of credit that can be claimed. Second, we
must remember that no investment tax credit results from a sale/lease-
back that occurs after the seller has used the property. The property
obviously cannot qualify as new property and it will not qualify as
"used" because the same person will be using the property after the
sale takes place. Presumably the property would qualify for investment
tax credit if the sale/leaseback occurred prior to the property's being
used by anyone. Third, there are the usual limitations pertaining to the
qualification of the property. One such rule that is often overlooked is
the fact that property used for lodging is not eligible for investment tax
credit.
I am sure each of you know all about depreciation and John Meagher
has told us that the rules will be changed soon anyway. Therefore, I
will leave a general discussion of that topic for another day and will
move now to "C" in the outline.
Questions with which I am often confronted are: "When is property
placed in service?" "When does 'original use' commence for investment
credit and depreciation purposes?" These questions often arise in equip-
ment leasing transactions when the issue is whether the original use of
leased property will be deemed to commence with the lessor. This is
particularly a problem when a lessee is already in possession of property
at the time the leasing transaction is consummated. This happens, for
example, when a lessee decides to lease equipment after he has already
received some or all of the equipment or when a lessee insists on testing
equipment before allowing title to pass to the lessor.
The series of rulings listed in the outline deal extensively with the
question of whether testing constitutes a use of property. These and
other rulings have established a relatively clear rule that a taxpayer
cannot claim investment credit or depreciation until all critical tests
have been performed. The fact that additional tests to eliminate any
defects remain to be performed will not prevent a taxpayer from claim-
ing investment credit or depreciation.
In Sears Oil the court held that barges were ready for use and there-
fore qualified for depreciation in December because they were ready for
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use even though they were frozen in a canal at that time and remained
that way until May of the following year. Rev. Rul. 76-238 held that
equipment was not placed in service for depreciation purposes until the
production line of which it was a part was available for the production
of an acceptable product. The Haddock case held that the leasing of
equipment by a lessor constitutes a use. In that case, a lessee purchased
property from his lessor. The lessee claimed that he was entitled to the
investment tax credit on the property because he had been the first user
of the property. The court concluded that leasing is a use and that the
lessor normally will be viewed as the first user of property.
Recapture of depreciation and investment credit is a major considera-
tion with which you are generally familiar. Since time does not allow
me to dwell on this subject, I will move along to the next subject-
"net leases." As mentioned at least two times, "net leases" are the sub-
ject of special rules:
(1) Interest incurred with respect to "net lease" property is regarded
as investment interest.
(2) Prior to 1976, only accelerated depreciation on property sub-
ject to a "net lease" was an item of tax preference.
A "net lease" is defined basically as a lease with respect to which the
lessor's section 162 expenses are less than 15 percent of rental income.
The expense test pertaining to a noncorporate lessor's ability to claim
investment tax credit is essentially the same. There are only two basic
differences between the "net lease" test and the noncorporate lessor
expense test: (1) expenses exactly equal to 15 percent of rental income
fail only the noncorporate lessor test and (2) the noncorporate lessor
test only applies for 12 months.
The first point that is common to both 15 percent tests is that only
deductions allowable solely by reason of section 162 qualify. This means
that depreciation expense, interest, and taxes cannot be taken into
account.
One of the ways to attempt to meet the 15 percent expense test is to
have the lessor retain the maintenance responsibility under the lease
and pay maintenance expenses. Another expense that often is incurred
by a lessor in an effort to meet the 15 percent test is the cost of prop-
erty and liability insurance. Particularly in the case of certain types of
property such as airplanes and ships, the insurance premium can be
quite significant. In addition, the possibility of prepaying expenses for
short periods should not be overlooked.
Another rule that is common to both 15 percent tests is that the
amount of rental to be paid under the lease must be determined without
reference to the expense items which the lessor agrees to pay. Thus, the
lease cannot require the lessee to reimburse the lessor for the expenses.
One possible way of dealing with this problem is for the lessor and
lessee to enter into short-term leases with rent set at a figure that is
high enough to give the lessor a proper return on his investment taking
into account projected expenses. If the lessor's expenses are greater
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than expected, the rental could be appropriately adjusted in subsequent
leases, assuming the lessee is agreeable to the adjustment. Of course, in
transactions of this nature, the Service's position concerning dealings
between lessors and their related corporations, as reflected in TAM
7928004 must be kept in mind.
One additional point that is common to both 15 percent tests should
be noted. It is possible that the 15 percent tests could work in reverse.
That is, it is possible that a lessor and lessee will have a lease that is
not intended to be a net lease but which fails the 15 percent tests solely
because the lessor's expenses do not equal or exceed 15 percent of
rental income. In that event, the interest expense associated with the
property still would be investment interest and the noncorporate lessor
would fail to qualify for the tax credit.
Let us now shift to the final subject that I would like to bring to your
attention-indemnification provisions in lease agreements. In my law
practice, I have yet to find a single provision in any contract or agree-
ment that is more complicated than such a provision.
Typically, a lessor will ask a lessee to assure the lessor, among other
things, (I) that the transaction will be treated as a true lease, (2) that
the lessor will be entitled to deduct depreciation and interest, (3) that
the lessor will be entitled to claim investment tax credit, and (4) that
the original use of the property will commence with the lessor for in-
vestment credit and depreciation purposes.
Most indemnification provisions require the lessee to make an addi-
tional payment to the lessor to account for the fact that indemnification
payments are themselves taxable.
Most indemnification provisions have formulas which take into ac-
count an offset for future tax benefits the lessor realizes because of the
tax adjustments. An example is a situation in which a lessee is required
to assure the lessor that the 200 percent double declining balance
method of depreciation is available. On audit it is determined that the
property is used property and that the lessor is qualified to use only the
150 percent declining balance method. Under these circumstances, the
amount to be paid by the lessee should take into account the fact that
the lessor will be entitled to additional depreciation in future years.
One problem is whether to use actual or hypothetical tax rates. If
actual costs and savings are to be considered, how can future lessor
benefits be taken into account? Should the lessor be required to refund
to the lessee an amount equal to actual future benefits? Perhaps the
only solution is to make a computation based upon assumed tax rates.
One other feature of indemnification provisions that warrants special
comment is the right given to the lessee to participate in any tax con-
test concerning the lease. If the lessee is required to give extensive
indemnification, the lessee probably should be given some right to par-
ticipate in any tax contest. As you can readily imagine, this can be
quite troublesome because most lessors have no interest in having a
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lessee participate in any way in the lessor's tax affairs. Trying to reach
a mutually satisfactually agreement on this point can be most difficult.
As you can see, we have covered a great number of complex prob-
lems associated with equipment leasing. I hope this presentation has
been helpful at least in identifying the different problems and considera-
tions that must be taken into account. If it has not answered your spe-
cific questions concerning leasing transactions, I hope you can find
answers in the authorities cited in the outline.
Thank you for your time and attention.
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3. Tax Shelter Leases
4. Leveraged Leasing
5. Leasing Companies
6. Lease From Manufacturer
7. Professional Corporations
B. Advantages to Lessee
1. Additional (Usually 100%) Financing
2. Avoidance of Loan Indenture Restrictions
3. Possible Avoidance of Balance Sheet Debt
4. Possible Lower "Effective Rate"
C. Advantages to Lessor
1. ITC
2. Secure, High-Return Investment
3. Tax Deferral
II. True Lease Concepts and Issues-Tax
A. General Legal Requirements and Considerations
1. IRC § 162(a) (3)-No Lessee Equity
2. IRS Guidelines
a. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39
b. Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19
c. TAM 7918005
d. Terminal Rental Adjustment-TAM 8019120
e. Puts and Calls-TAM 8020014
3. T. Wayne Davis, 37 T.C.M. 1441 (1978).
4. Real Estate Sale/Leaseback Cases
a. Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 39-2 U.S.T.C. 9793,
308 U.S. 252 (1939).
b. Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 78-1 U.S.T.C. 9370, 435
U.S. 561 (1978).
c. American Realty Trust v. U.S., 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9528,
498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
d. Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 76-2 U.S.T.C. 9773,
554 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
e. Carol W. Hilton, 74 T.C. No. 23 (1980).
5. Leasing Company Cases
a. Lockhart Leasing Co. v. U.S., 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9470,
446 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 54 T.C. 301
(1970).
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b. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Comm'r, 74-2
U.S.T.C. 9 9619, 500 F.2d 1222, (9th Cir. 1974),
afl'g, 58 T.C. 836 (1972).
B. Leveraged Leases
1. Scrutinized More Closely For Several Reasons
a. Net Lease
b. Long Term Relationship
c. Lessor With Only Limited Interest
d. Lessor With Only Limited Risk
2. IRS Ruling Guidelines-Rev. Procs. 75-21 (1975-1 C.B.
715) and 75-28 (1975-1 C.B. 752).
a. 20% Equity Investment By Lessor
i. Based on Consideration Paid or Unconditional
Liability
ii. Determined as a Percentage of Cost
iii. No Return Requirement
iv. Maintenance of Investment Requirement
b. No Investment by Lessee
i. Cost Overruns
ii. Lessee Improvements
iii. Ordinary Maintenance and Repairs
iv. Expenditures and Improvements to Comply With
External Requirements
v. No Loan or Guarantee
c. 20% Residual Value and 20% Residual Life Require-
ments
i. Determined Without Regard to Inflation or Defla-
tion
ii. "Use," Not "Scrap," Value
iii. Life Estimated and Demonstrated by Expert
iv. Economic Useful Life of Property
d. Options
i. Lessee Options at FMV
ii. No Lessor Puts
e. Lessor Profit Requirement
i. Profit Excluding Tax Benefits
ii. Reasonable Cash Flow
f. Lease Term Defined
i. Includes Non-FMV Options
ii. Includes Puts
g. Uneven Rents
3. Special or Limited Use Property
a. Probability of Lessee as Sole User. Rev. Proc. 76-30,
1976-2 C.B. 647.




1. Tax Court and Several Circuits Requirements-Quinlivan
v. Comm'r, 79-1 U.S.T.C. ' 9396, 599 F.2d 269 (8th
Cir. 1979), aff'g, 37 T.C.M. 346 (1978).
i. Grantor/Lessor Does Not Retain Control
ii. Leaseback in Writing
iii. Leaseback Business Purpose
iv. Grantor/Lessee Has No Disqualifying Equity
2. Fourth and Fifth Circuits Require Gift Business Purpose
For "Entire Transaction"-Perry v. U.S., 75-2 U.S.T.C.
4 9629, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1975).
D. Consequences of Reclassification
1. Conditional Sale-Rev. Rul. 72-408, 1972-2 C.B. 86.
2. Financing Transaction-Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B.
87.
III. True Lease Concepts and Issues-Nontax
A. Commercial Law
1. Delineating The Issue-Different Security Interests
2. Filing Financial Statement
3. Definition-Va. Code § 8.1-201(37)
B. Consumer Law
1. Delineating The Issue-Different Disclosure Requirements
2. Open-End Leases
3. Definition-Reg. 2-2
C. Financial Reporting-FASB 13 (November, 1976) and In-
terpretations
1. Lessees-Capital Leases v. Operating Leases
a. Ownership Passes to Lessee
b. Bargain Purchase Option
c. Lease Term Equals or Exceeds 75% of Economic
Asset Life
d. Present Value of Minimum Lease Payments Equals or
Exceeds 90% of Asset FMV
2. Lessors-Sales Type, Direct Financing or Operating
a. Sales Type
i. One of Above Four Tests
ii. Two Additional Requirements
1. Payments Reasonably Assured
2. No Uncertainty About Future Unreimbursed
Costs





IV. Special Shelter Considerations and Problems (Other Than ITC
and Depreciation)
A. At-Risk Rules
B. Tax Preference Items (IRC § 57)
1. Minimum and Maximum Tax Consequences
2. Accelerated Depreciation Lease Property
3. Rapid Amortization
C. Investment Interest (IRC § 163(d))
1. Limitation on Deduction
2. Interest on Net Lease Property
a. Expenses Less Than 15%
b. Guarantee Against Loss
D. Partnership Matters
1. Allocation and Special Partnership Considerations
2. Classification of Partnership
a. Sole Corporate General Partner Ruling Guidelines-
Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735
i. Cross-Ownership Prohibition
ii. Net Worth Requirement
b. Other Ruling Requirements-Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1
C.B. 438
i. Tax Loss in First Two Years
ii. One Percent Interest in General Partner
c. The Four Basic Characteristics
i. Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq.
1979-1 C.B. 1.
ii. Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448.
3. Separate Entity Concept
a. Accounting Method
b. Taxable Year
c. Depreciation Conventions and Rates-Prop. Reg.
1.167 (a)- 11 (c) (2) (iv).
E. Profit Motive (IRC § 183)
1. Tax Benefits
2. Arnold A. Ginsburg, 35 T.C.M. 860 (1976).
F. Special Benefits for Special Equipment
1. Certified Pollution Control Facility (IRC § 169).
2. Qualified Railroad Rolling Stock (IRC § 184).
3. Single Purpose Agricultural Structures (IRC § 48(p)).
G. Bail-Out Possibilities
1. Contribution to Corporation
2. Exchange of Interests-Gulfstream Land & Development
Corp., 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
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V. ITC and Depreciation Considerations
A. ITC Limitations
1. Noncorporate Lessors (IRC § 46(e) (3))
a. General Disallowance of Credit
b. Avoidance of Problem
i. Manufacture or Produce Property-Narrow Con-
struction By IRS-Rev. Rul. 75-1, 1975-1 C.B. 5.
ii. Expense/Lease Term Test
(A) Lease Term Less Than 50% of Life
(1) Cancellation Ineffective-Leroy Bloom-
berg, 74 T.C. No. 102 (9/23/80).
(2) TAM 7928004-Lease on "As Needed"
Basis to Related Party
(B) Expenses During First 12 Months Greater
Than 15% of Rental Income
iii. Pass-Through to Lessee (IRC § 48(d))
(A) New Property Only
(B) Elect By Return Due Date-Rev. Rul. 79-
414, 1979-2 C.B. 21.
(C) Special Rules When Property Has Class Life
in Excess of 14 Years
iv. Allocation to Corporate Partners
2. 100% of Tax Liability Up to $25,000 and Percentage of
Excess (IRC § 46(a)(3))
3. Gift/Sale/Leaseback-No ITC
4. Qualification of Property
a. Life of Property (Same as Depreciable Life) (IRC
§ 46(c) (2))
b. Type of Property
i. General Rules
ii. Property Used For Lodging Not Eligible
iii. Foreign Property Not Eligible
c. Prohibited Use or Person
B. Depreciation
1. Bonus Depreciation
2. Availability of Accelerated Methods
3. Useful Life
a. Period to be Used by Taxpayer





C. Placed in Service and Original Use Issues
1. Testing
a. Rev. Rul. 69-272, 1969-1 C.B. 23.
b. Rev. Rul. 76-256, 1976-2 C.B. 46.
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c. Rev. Rul. 79-40, 1979-1 C.B. 40.
d. Rev. Rul. 79-98, 1979-1 C.B. 103.
2. Readiness and Availability
a. Sears Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 66-1 U.S.T.C. 9384, 359
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966) (barges frozen in)
b. Rev. Rul. 76-238, 1976-1 C.B. 55 (production line)
3. Leasing As Use-Gilbert Haddock, 70 T.C. 511 (1978).
D. Recapture
1. Contributions to Corporations
2. Replacements
3. Sale/Leaseback (Reg. § 1.47-3(g))
VI. "Net Lease" Rules
A. Relevance
1. Tax Preference Definitions (IRC § 57(c))
2. Investment Interest Definitions (IRS § 163(d) (4))
3. ITC Limitation (IRC § 46(e)(3))
B. Expenses Equal to or Less Than 15% of Rental Income




d. Service Agreement (Reg. § 1.46-4(d) (3) (iii))
e. Insurance (e.g., ships and airplanes)
2. "Equal To" Fails IRC § 46(e) (3) Test Only
3. Rental Determined Without Reference to Expense
a. Not Reimbursed
b. Short-Term Lease With Adjustments
c. Graduated Rental Payments
4. Expense Test Could Be Applicable Even If Lease Not





2. Depreciation, ITC and Interest
3. Original Use
B. Computation
1. Tax Consequences of Indemnification Payments
2. Offset For Future Lessor Benefits
C. Right to Contest
